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ADVOCACY AND ASSOCIATION
John D. Inazu*
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) 1 is riddled with factual,
procedural, and legal complexities. The litigation spanned twelve years. 2 The
plaintiffs were a mixture of individuals and groups. The constitutional claims and
the government interests were weighty.3 The meaning and scope of the “material
support” statute were highly contested.4 But this much is clear: the United States
government believed that in some circumstances a lawyer who filed an amicus
brief on behalf of a client would be subject to criminal liability under the material
support provision.5 At the same time, the government and the Supreme Court were
quick to emphasize that mere membership in one of these groups was not
prohibited under the statute, for that would have violated the right of association.6
So the freedom of association protects the right of a lawyer to join a group, but not
to engage in legal advocacy on behalf of that group.
Margaret Tarkington’s Freedom of Attorney-Client Association exposes the
constitutional reasoning that leads to these counterintuitive conclusions. 7 More
importantly, Professor Tarkington shows us why it matters, and why we would be
wise to alter course. Rather than simply postulating yet another variant of the right
of association, 8 she ably demonstrates why protections for our ability to form
relationships and foster ideas are indispensable predicates to other First
Amendment freedoms but not reducible to only those freedoms.9
* © 2013 John D. Inazu, Associate Professor of Law and Political Science,
Washington University.
1
130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
2
Id. at 2716.
3
See id. at 2722–24.
4
See id. at 2724–25.
5
Id. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “the Government’s claim that the ban
here, so supported, prohibits a lawyer hired by a designated group from filing on behalf of
that group an amicus brief before the United Nations or even before this Court”
underscores the problem with banning advocacy on the theory that such advocacy
legitimizes the group’s conduct).
6
Id. at 2718 (majority opinion) (“Section 2339B does not criminalize mere
membership in a designated foreign terrorist organization. It instead prohibits providing
‘material support’ to such a group.”).
7
Margaret Tarkington, Freedom of Attorney-Client Association, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 1071.
8
See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (referring to a
right of “political association”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18, 622 (1984)
(establishing the rights of intimate and expressive association).
9
Although I will not belabor the point here, I think that Professor Tarkington’s
reliance on De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945), illustrates the ways in which both the general right of association and the more
specific application of attorney-client association are traceable to, and derivative of, the
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As Professor Tarkington notes, HLP’s odd elevation of bare membership over
an activity like legal advocacy illustrates the kind of results-oriented formalism
that plagues current First Amendment approaches to the rights of speech and
association.10 That formalism misses in two directions: (1) by conflating the two
rights and the values they represent; and (2) by ignoring the ways in which those
rights complement and reinforce one another. The Court’s decision in Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez 11 illustrates the first kind of formalism. 12 Professor
Tarkington highlights how HLP illustrates the second:
[T]he Court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs’ free speech rights
were not abridged because they were still free to “say anything they wish
on any topic” and “may speak and write freely” about their concerns
regarding their proposed clients. As characterized by the Court, the
plaintiff attorneys were forbidden from engaging in “only a narrow
category of speech”—namely, “speech to, under the direction of, or in
coordination with” their desired clientele. In so holding, the Court
interpreted the right of free speech separately from the right of
association. Having endowed the attorneys with speech, but denied them
the ability to speak in association with those who needed to hear what
they had to say, the Court went on to find, in a very cursory passage, that
there also was no violation of the plaintiffs’ right of association.13
The result is striking: “By separating speech and association, the court
undermined both rights.”14 And, as Professor Tarkington notes, in the context of
attorney-client association: “The idea that attorney free speech rights are preserved
by allowing attorneys to engage in ‘independent advocacy,’ but prohibiting
associated advocacy is absurd.”15
None of the preceding commentary means that HLP’s holding is necessarily
wrong. The state also has important interests, and none weightier than its own
national security. Chief Justice Roberts rightly acknowledges that “[e]veryone
agrees that the Government’s interest in combatting terrorism is an urgent

First Amendment’s right of assembly. See, e.g., Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1084 n.74 and
1103 n.180. For a more detailed explanation, see JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE
FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012).
10
See Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1100. See also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011).
11
130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
12
Id. at 2985 (concluding that the petitioner’s “expressive-association and free-speech
arguments merge . . . .”). For my critique of this conflation in Martinez, see John D. Inazu,
Justice Ginsburg and Religious Liberty, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1213, 1233–34 (2012).
13
Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1082 (citations omitted); see also id. at 1080.
14
Id. at 1082. Cf. id. (“Considered in combination, the HLP Court’s ruling on free
speech and free association works to deny the core attributes of each right.”).
15
Id. at 1084.
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objective of the highest order.”16 And that objective is facilitated by appropriate
law enforcement activities and the use of criminal law, including criminal
conspiracy law. Although these kinds of tools are not impervious to abuse, the
activity they target is an appropriate focus of potential restrictions. Lawyers
advocating on behalf of clients are not.
Professor Tarkington and I share similar worries about the reasoning and
rhetoric of HLP. I am less persuaded by—or at least more cautious about—the
theoretical arguments that she advances to ground the idea of attorney-client
association. I will focus on two of them: the instrumental argument and the
democratic argument.17
Professor Tarkington’s instrumental argument is that the right of association
“is essential to secure the other rights expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”18 Her reasoning resembles the Supreme Court’s explanation for the
right of “expressive association” first announced in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees. 19 The problem with this analytical move is that its instrumental focus
converts a foundational right into a derivative one. 20 Our freedom to form
relationships and groups stands on its own without the need to harness it for the
advancement of other First Amendment freedoms.
Professor Tarkington’s second theoretical focus is the democratic argument:
the First Amendment’s freedoms “work together to preserve the American form of
government.”21 I do not disagree with this normative impulse or its connection to
the sources that Professor Tarkington enlists. But I worry that the focus on
preserving “the American form of government” risks morphing a protection
against government into a defense of government.
What, then, is the reason for protecting this idea of attorney-client
association? Professor Tarkington gestures toward what I believe is the best
answer when she discusses Vincent Blasi’s checking theory of the First
Amendment.22 I think, however, that a more powerful argument draws from an
even deeper suspicion of state power, one that jealously guards the tools and
resources available to us to push back against that power. Like lawyers who argue
on behalf of clients.
In my view, one of Professor Tarkington’s most important insights is the
connection that she draws between legal advocacy and attorney-client association.
As she writes: “Legal advocacy is associated advocacy.”23 This nice turn-of-phrase
16

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010).
Professor Tarkington’s third argument—that guilt is personal—is both interesting
and plausible but has less to do with the kinds of associational observations that I
offer here.
18
Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1077.
19
468 U.S. 609 (1984); see id. at 622.
20
See INAZU, supra note 9, at 127, 140–41.
21
Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1090.
22
Id. at 1091 (citing Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FOUND RES. J. 521 (1977)).
23
Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1084.
17
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underscores one of the ways in which informal politics precedes formal politics.
The lawyer as advocate (who files briefs and delivers arguments) flows out of the
lawyer as counselor (who listens to clients, shapes arguments, and forms
relationships). In this sense, Professor Tarkington’s focus on attorney-client
association mirrors the ways in which many groups function as the pre-political
spaces in which ideas and relationships are formed in the first place. It is not
enough for us to focus on the moment of expression (or the moment of advocacy)
because we will never arrive at these moments without sufficient protection for the
background circumstances in which they are crafted. 24 That to me is the core
reason that we must be vigilant to protect the groups out of which ideas and
advocacy emerge. These protections are not absolute—we will rightly worry about
and constrain criminal activity, threats of violence, and improper uses of power.
But in policing those lines, we should be cognizant of the state’s ability to
encroach too deeply, to describe too uncharitably, and to control too rigidly. In this
sense, HLP’s rhetoric may be more dangerous than its holding. Professor
Tarkington has helped us see why this is the case.

24

See INAZU, supra note 9, at 5.

